Capital Mobility and Tax Competition: A Survey by Clemens Fuest et al.





CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 956
CATEGORY PUBLIC FINANCE
MAY 2003
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 956
CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TAX COMPETITION:
A SURVEY
Abstract
This paper surveys the literature on the implications of international capital mobility for
national tax policies. Our main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of
income, specifically capital income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed
relative to domestic investment and whether welfare gains can be achieved through
international tax coordination. We develop a a “working horse model” of multinational
investment which allows to derive many of the key results from the literature on international
taxation in a unified framework. Moreover, we put special emphasis on the problem of tax
competition and financial arbitrage.
JEL Code: H21, H25.
Keywords: tax competition, capital mobility, tax policy.
Clemens Fuest














Rotman School of Management
105 St. George St.








Tax competition and co-ordination is one of the most pressing issues for tax authorities in modern 
economies.  It is also a highly controversial subject. Some argue that tax competition is beneficial by 
forcing governments to impose efficient tax prices on residents for the provision of public services 
(Tiebout (1956)).  In other words, if tax competition leads to less use of source-based taxes (such as 
taxes on businesses), this would improve the tax policy in competitive economies.  Further, some 
argue that tax competition is also beneficial by limiting the power of governments to levy taxes 
(Kehoe (1989) and Edwards and Keen (1994)).  
 
Others take a different view. Taxes levied by jurisdictions can impose spillover (or fiscal externality) 
costs on other jurisdictions (Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and Gordon (1983)).  This can take the form 
of “tax base flight” whereby a jurisdiction’s tax results in mobile factors fleeing to low-tax 
jurisdictions (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986).  Alternatively, unco-ordinated taxes can result in 
“tax exportation” whereby a government shifts the tax burden of financing local public services onto 
non-residents (e.g. taxes on foreign corporations).  Therefore, in a world without co-ordinated tax 
policies, governments choose sub-optimal levels of public services financed by inefficient taxes that 
are either too high or too low by ignoring spillovers imposed on other jurisdictions. 
   
In recent years, the OECD and the European Union have become increasingly concerned about tax 
competition. Historically, the OECD developed  a model “tax treaty” to limit tax avoidance and 
reduce “tax exportation” arising from double taxation of income earned by a multinational parent with 
operations in a capital importing country.  A recent OECD project, controversially named “harmful 
tax competition”, is intended to reduce the scope for “tax base flight” externalities by removing 
incentives to shift tax bases to low-tax jurisdictions.  The European Union has not only been looking 
to implement a “code of conduct” to limit the scope of tax competition but the member countries 
have also been forced to adopt limitations on tax exportation that discriminates between foreigners 
and domestic owners of capital.
1   Agreements to limit tax competition have not been easily 
achieved. Even in the latest round of negotiations, some countries like Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom have objected to EU or OECD attempts to limit tax competition. 
 
                                                 
1Recent European court cases induced Britain and other EU countries to revise their tax systems for the 
integration of corporate and personal taxes.  Most governments only provided a dividend tax credit for domestic 
shareholders as an offset for corporate taxes paid on income prior to distribution to shareholders.  Effectively, a 
German company operating in Britain argued that the dividend tax credit should also be extended to German 
shareholders as part of the European Union.  The court determined that a tax credit should be paid to 
shareholders in other European countries.  Rather than try to pay credits to foreign shareholders, the United 
Kingdom changed its existing system to integrate corporate and personal taxes by abolishing the a corporate 
level tax on distributions and reducing personal taxes on dividends to a level so that the combined corporate 
(30%) and personal tax rate (10%) on dividends was approximately equal to the top rate on salary and other 




The purpose of this survey is to draw out the most important issues of un-coordinated tax policy at 
the international level for cross-border transactions. The discussion focuses on mobile tax bases, 
specifically in relation to investment and financial transactions. Two important caveats are thus in 
order. The first is that, even though labour is mobile to some degree, there is still relatively little 
labour mobility at the international level (Helliwell (2000)). Thus, we concern ourselves with tax 
competition in relation to mobile capital and finance.
2 The second is that investment and financial 
transactions are taxed at the business level and household level. Although there is certainly some 
significant concern on part of authorities that individual residents can escape taxation on income by 
investing wealth in low-tax offshore jurisdictions, the most substantial problems arise with respect to 
business income and financial transactions taxes since most cross-border transactions involve 
companies and financial intermediaries. 
 
Our main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital 
income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domestic investment and 
whether welfare gains can be achieved through international tax coordination. The survey should be 
seen as complementing related contributions which include Keen (1993), Wilson (1999), Wellisch 
(2000), Gresik (2001) and Haufler (2001). One difference to these surveys is that our paper 
attempts to derive some of the key results on the taxation of international investment income in a kind 
of working horse model which we develop in section II. Moreover, we devote a lot of attention to 
the problem of tax competition and financial arbitrage, an issue which is somewhat neglected in the 
existing surveys. 
 
The outline for the paper is the following. The paper consists of two major parts. The first part 
(section II) deals with the implications of tax competition for national tax policy. Section II. 1. begins 
with a discussion of some basic results for the optimal taxation of border crossing direct investment. 
In the following sections, we extend our analysis to include the role of double taxation agreements 
(section II.2), public goods provision (section II.3), portfolio investment (section II.4) and transfer 
pricing (section II.5). In section II.6 deals with the role of the financing decisions and financial 
arbitrage for investment and tax policy under tax competition. The second major part of the paper 
(section III.) deals with the problem of tax coordination. We start with the basic idea that tax 
competition leads to an underprovision of  public goods (section III. 1.) and then consider the role of 
labour taxes (section III.2), residence based capital income taxes (section III.3), and redistributive 
income taxation (section III.4). Section  III.5 discusses reasons why taxes may be too high rather 
than too low under tax competition. Finally, section III.6 focuses on the problem of regional versus 




                                                 




II. International Capital Income Taxation and Tax Competition 
 
1. How should foreign investment income be taxed? 
 
An early analysis of the taxation of foreign investment income is due to Musgrave and Brewer (1963) 
and Musgrave (1969). They argue that a country should tax the income from foreign investment of 
domestic firms “in order to ensure that further investment is not made if the net foreign return is below 
the gross return on domestic investment“(Musgrave, 1969, p. 98). One way of achieving this is to 
tax foreign profits at the same rate as domestic profits but let foreign taxes be deducted from the tax 
base. A formal treatment of this question which leads to the same result can be found in the seminal 
paper by Feldstein and Hartman (1979). These authors analyse the optimal taxation of capital 
income resulting from international direct investment. The key result can be derived from a simplified 
version of their model.  
 
Consider a world of two jurisdictions denoted as the home country and the foreign country. There is 
a multinational firm that has its headquarters in the home country and produces domestically and 









where K and L are capital and labour and the subscripts d and f refer to the home country and the 
foreign country, respectively. Labour is assumed to be internationally immobile and fixed in supply. 






f) have the usual neoclassical properties and exhibit 
constant returns to scale. Moreover, denote by t
d the domestic profit tax rate and by t
f the profit tax 





fixed. Assuming that all investment is equity financed, after tax profits of the multinational firm (P) can 
be expressed as 
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f denote the domestic and foreign wage rates, 
 
t t a t
E f d = - + ( ) 1                      (2) 
 
is the effective tax rate on foreign investment and a is a parameter which captures the treatment of 
foreign profits and taxes paid in the foreign country by the domestic tax system. For example, a = t 
d 
would imply a deduction system while a = 1 would represent the case where foreign taxes are (fully) 











that is the firm equates the marginal productivity of capital net of taxes in the two countries. Equation 
(3) thus describes the allocation of the capital stock across countries, given the tax policies of the 
home and the foreign country.  
 
Feldstein and Hartman concentrate on the tax policy of the capital exporting country and assume that 
the government pursues the objective of maximizing domestic income including domestic tax revenue. 
There is no public sector revenue requirement such that tax policy is used exclusively to influence 
international capital movements. The capital exporting country takes the wage rate w
f and the tax 
policy of the foreign country as given. Domestic income is  
 
( ) F K L t F K L w L
d d d f f f f f f ( , ) ( ) ( , ) + - - 1 .              (4) 
 
For a given t
f, the domestic government can control K




f), using its tax 
instruments t
d and a. The policy which maximizes domestic income implies  
 
F t F K
d f
K
f = - ( ) 1 .                    (5) 
 
The explanation for this result is that, at the optimum, the contribution to domestic income of a 
marginal unit of capital invested domestically, including the tax revenue it generates, should equal the 
marginal productivity of capital invested abroad, net of foreign taxes, as already stated by Musgrave 
(1969). The implication of (5) for domestic tax policy is easily derived by substituting (5) and (2) into 
(3), which yields a=t
d. The home country will thus fully tax repatriated profits but allow the 
multinational to deduct taxes paid abroad from the tax base (full taxation after deduction).  
 
One i mportant assumption made in the Feldstein-Hartman model is that countries face no legal 
constraints in the taxation of income from foreign investment. While this is a useful benchmark case 
for theoretical analysis, empirical tax policy vis-à-vis multinational firms is usually constrained by 
double taxation agreements. This is why a large part of the literature on the taxation of international 
direct investment takes into account the rules stipulated in double taxation agreements.  
 
2. Tax competition and double taxation agreements 
 
Most existing double taxation agreements follow the OECD Double Taxation Convention (OECD, 
1997). According to this model treaty, countries are allowed to tax the income from foreign 
investment of their multinational firms either according to the credit system or the exemption system. 
Under the exemption system, foreign profits are exempt from domestic taxation. If the exemption 
system is applied, after tax profits of the multinational firm are 
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In contrast, if the tax credit system is applied, foreign profits are subject to domestic taxation. Taxes 
on foreign profits paid abroad are credited against domestic taxes on foreign profits. The maximum 
credit is, however, the domestic tax liability on foreign profits, i.e. the domestic government does not 
fully refund foreign taxes if the foreign tax rate is higher than the domestic one. After tax profits can 
then be written as 
 
( ) ( ) P t F K L w L t t F K L w L
d d d d d d d f f f f f f = - - + - - ( ) ( , ) ( max[ , ]) ( , ) 1 1 .      (7) 
 
A large part of the literature on the taxation of multinational firms has concentrated on the tax credit 
system. An important question in the literature on tax policy under the foreign tax credit system is 
whether it leads to more efficient outcomes than the deduction system. In the earlier literature 
(Musgrave, 1969), the full taxation after deduction system is usually seen as inefficient from a global 
point of view because it gives rise to a double taxation of income from international investment and 
thus discriminates foreign relative to domestic investment. Under the credit system, in contrast, no 
such double taxation occurs. For given tax rates, the deduction system is thus less favourable to 
trade in capital than the credit system. However, this does not mean that the tax credit system 
necessarily leads to more efficient outcomes. An important contribution analysing tax policy under the 
credit system is Bond and Samuelson (1989). They use a variant of the Feldstein-Hartman-model to 
analyse the outcome of tax competition under the credit system. It turns out that, if one takes into 
account that the level of tax rates depends on system of double taxation relief, the bias against trade 
in capital is much worse under the credit system.
3 
 
The anti trade bias of the credit system can be demonstrated using the model introduced above. The 
foreign tax credit system implies that the effective tax rate on foreign investment is t t t
E df f = max[ , ], 
where t
df now denotes the domestic tax rate on corporate income from foreign investment. The tax 
rate on domestic profits  (t
d) is assumed to be zero. The profits of the multinational firm are 
( ) F K L w L t t F K L w L
d d d d d df f f f f f f ( , ) ( max[ , ]) ( , ) - + - - 1 . The firm´s optimal investment 
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The optimal level of employment in the foreign country (L
f) satisfies the standard marginal 
productivity condition  F w L
i i = , i=d,f. The analysis thus assumes that firms take the factor prices w
d 
and w
f as given.  
 
                                                 




Under tax competition, the capital exporting and the capital importing country simultaneously set their 




f increases tax revenue in the capital imorting country but leaves the capital stock K
f 
unchanged. Therefore, the capital importing country will always set t
f‡t
df. What about the capital 
exporting country? For the capital exporting country, it is also suboptimal to choose a lower tax rate 
than the capital importing country. Effectively, if t
df<t
f, the credit system is equivalent to the exemption 
system and the level of t
df plays no role. So the question arises whether the domestic country would 
want to raise t
df above t
f. It turns out that this is the case if and only if the volume of capital exports K
f 
affects the wage  rate in the capital importing country. National income of the capital exporting 
country is ( ) F K L t F K L w L
d d d f f f f f f ( , ) ( ) ( , ) + - - 1 . Using  S K K
d d f - =  and the conditions for 
the firm`s optimal investment and employment decisions, the effect of a marginal increase of t
df on 
domestic welfare welfare, evaluated at t
df=t
f, can be written as  
 
- - = - > ( ) ( ) 1 1 0 t w L t K F K
f
t





df df .              (9) 
 
It thus turns out that the capital exporting country will always want to set t
df>t
f. As equation (9) 
shows, the reason for the capital exporting country to raise its tax rate above that of the capital 
importing country is that the wage rate w
f in the foreign country declines if t
df increases (and K
f 
declines). Since the capital exporting firms are assumed to take w
f as given, there is an incentive to 
use tax policy as an instrument of exploiting market power vis-à-vis the capital importing country. Of 
course, t
df>t
f cannot hold in equilibrium because the optimal tax policy of the capital importing 
country implies t
f‡t
df. This implies that the only equilibrium under the foreign tax credit system is an 
equilibrium where tax rates are so high that border crossing investment vanishes. 
  
A critical assumption underlying the above analysis is that countries may levy different tax rates on 
income from foreign and domestic investment. The OECD Double Taxation Convention (1997)
4 
forbids this type of discrimination.
5 Many contributions to the literature therefore rule out the 
possibility of raising different tax rates on domestic and foreign source income (Gordon, 1992, 
Janeba, 1995, Davies, 1999, Fuest and Huber, 2002). In our model, this implies t
df=t
d. So let t
d be 
the uniform tax rate on domestic and foreign source income of the capital exporting country. Under 
this assumption, it can be shown that tax competition under the credit system leads to an equilibrium 
with positive international capital flows.  
 
To see this, note first that the capital importing country will pursue the same policy, i.e. it will always 
set t
f‡t
d. In contrast, the policy of the capital exporting country changes. It is an immediate 
implication of nondiscrimination that the capital exporting country cannnot increase its welfare by 
raising t
d above t
f. The reason is that, if t
d‡t
f, an increase in t
d does not affect the capital allocation. 
                                                 




This implies that the terms of trade effect which drives the result in Bond and Samuelson (1989) 
cannot occur here. The tax increase only shifts income from the firm owners to the government of the 
capital exporting country. This has no effect on welfare. So the next question whether the capital 




f, a reduction in t
d reduces the tax burden on 
domestic investment but leaves the tax burden on foreign investment unchanged. For t
d<t
f we 
therefore have  K
t
d
d < 0. This implies that the capital exporting country may still strategically reduce 
the supply of capital to the foreign country by reducing t
d. However, this comes at the cost of 
distorting domestic investment. If t
d<t
f, the effect of a marginal increase in t
d on domestic income is 
 








d d - - ( ) 1 .                  (10) 
 
Equation (10) implies that the capital exporting country will subsidise domestic investment in 
equilibrium. The optimal subsidy balances the marginal benefit from the subsidy, the reduction in the 
foreign wage rate, against the cost, which is a distortion of domestic investment. Note that, if the 
capital exporting country is assumed to be small, i.e. it takes w
f as given, it will simply set t
d=0.  
 
What is the response of the capital importing country? National income of the capital importing 
country can be written as F K L t K F
f f f f f
K
f ( , ) ( ) - - 1 . Maximizing this expression over t
f immediately 
leads to the result that the capital importing country will set t
f=0 if it is small, i.e. it takes the required 
return to investment( ) 1- t F
d
K
d as given. If it is large, it takes into account that a relocation of capital 
to the capital exporting country lowers the required rate of return. In this case, it exploits its market 
power and sets t
f>0. The assumption of nondiscrimination between corporate taxes on domestic and 
foreign profits thus leads to the well known finding that capital exporting countries will subsidize 
domestic investment in order to improve their terms of trade in capital whereas large capital 
importing countries will tax capital for the same reason (see, for instance, Sinn, 1988). The result that 
tax credits lead to vanishing trade in capital does not hold anymore.
6 So an important policy 
conclusion emerging from the discussion in t his section is that nondiscrimination clauses in 
international tax treaties help to avoid an excessive taxation of international direct investment.  
 
3. The role of public goods provision 
 
In the literature discussed so far, corporate income taxes essentially have the function to influence the 
terms of trade in capital. While this may well be a relevant factor in tax policy decisions in some 
cases, it cannot explain corporate tax policy in general. If terms of trade considerations generally 
determined corporate tax policy, one would expect that tax policy depends on whether countries are 
                                                                                                                                                         
5 In practice, though, many countries do discriminate between domestic and foreign income, see Hines (1988).  
6 The analysis also replicates the result in Janeba (1995), who shows that the exemption system and the foreign 
tax credit systems lead to the same allocations. Janeba does not allow for negative tax rates, but doing so does 




net capital exporters or capital importers. This is not consistent with the observed patterns of tax 




Of course, the main reason for levying taxes in general is that governments have to finance their 
expenditure on publicly provided goods. However, this does not necessarily imply that corporate 
income taxes will be used. In fact, a well known result of optimal tax theory states that a small open 
economy should not levy source based capital taxes if other tax instruments such as, for instance, 
labour taxes, are available (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971,  Gordon, 1986). In the light of this 
theoretical finding, the empirical observation that countries do levy corporate income taxes is 
puzzling. Gordon (1992) discusses possible explanations for this puzzle. He argues that, in a world 
where public goods have to be financed via distortionary taxes, positive corporate income taxes may 
be explained by the existence of tax credits. 
 
Gordon`s results can be derived in an extended version of the model used in the preceding sections. 






d denote private and public consumption and M(.) and H(.) are 
concave functions with the usual properties. The government may finance G via two tax instruments: 
the corporate income tax and a tax on the income of the fixed factor L
d. Residence based taxes on 
capital income levied at the household level are ruled out. We assume, though, that the government 
would like to raise residence based taxes, which implies that H G>UC holds. We assume further that 
the income of the fixed factor is taxed at a rate of 100%. It is well known that, if there are untaxed 
rents, it is optimal to levy positive source based capital taxes, so that it would not be surprising to 
find positive corporate income taxes if rent taxation is restricted. For the capital importing country, 
we make the same assumptions.
8  
 
What is the equilibrium tax policy emerging under tax competition? Consider first the capital 
importing country. In order to exclude terms of trade considerations from the analysis, Gordon 




It turns out that the capital importing country will never set t
f<t
d because, if t
f<t
d, it can always raise 
tax revenue by increasing t
f without changing domestic investment. It is also easy to show that the 
capital importing country will not raise t
f above t
d (provided that t
d‡0) because this would distort 
investment while the increase in corporate tax revenue would be smaller than the decline in rent tax 
revenue. The capital importing country thus always sets t
f=t
d.  
                                                 
7 Gordon and Varian (1989) develop a model where countries are small but have specific risk characteristics, this is 
also a source of market power. However, the optimal tax policy implies that countries would subsidise rather than 
tax domestic investment. 
8 On the optimal taxation of capital in the presence of untaxed rents, see Horst (1980) and Keen and Piekkola 
(1997). By assumption, the household residing in the capital importing country has no capital income. The 





What about the capital exporting country? The budget constraint of the private household in the 
capital exporting country is  
 
C t F K t t F K
d d
K
d d d f
K
f f = - + - ( ) ( max[ , ]) 1 1               (11) 
 
and the government´s budget is  
 
G F K L t F K t t F K
d d d d d
K
d d d f
K
f f = - - + - ( , ) ( ) max[ , ] 1 0           (12) 
 
The government of the capital exporting country also takes the rate of return on exported capital 
( ) 1- t F
f
K
f  as given. Consider first the case with t
d<t
f. In this case, the effect of a marginal increase in 
t






d  which is negative for t
d>0. Things are different if t
d‡t
f. In this 
case, a marginal increase in t
d reduces the after tax rate of return on investment in both countries but 
leaves the capital allocation unaffected. The effect on domestic welfare is 




G C + - > 0. For a given corporate tax rate in the capital importing country, an 
increase in t
d is equivalent to an increase in a residence based tax on capital income. As long as 
HG>UC , the government of the capital exporting country will want to levy such a tax. Of course, t
d>t
f 
cannot be an equilibrium since the capital importing country always wants to set t
f=t
d. It thus turns out 
that no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists. One may note that this result emerges despite the 
assumption that the capital exporting country must set a uniform corporate income tax rate for 
domestic and foreign profits.  
 
Thus, the conclusion emerging from the above analysis is that, if both countries move simultaneously 
and take the tax rate of the other country as given, tax credits cannot explain the existence of positive 
corporate income taxes. As a second step, Gordon (1992) therefore considers the case where the 
capital exporting country acts as a Stackelberg leader, i.e. it takes into account that the capital 
importing country will always set t
f=t
d. In this case, the effect of a marginal increase in t
d on the 




C - - . The first term is positive if 
H U G C > , which reflects that welfare increases as income is transferred from the private to the 
public sector. The second term is negative and captures the effect of the increase in the foreign tax 
rate. This implies that an equilibrium with positive corporate taxes is possible. Gordon (1992) 
explains this as follows: “From the investor´s perspective, it is as if the country were using a 
residence-based tax. The government, however, cedes the tax revenue on capital exports to the 
other governments...reducing the attractiveness of the tax relative to a true residence based tax....The 





It thus turns out that corporate income taxes may survive under tax competition if income from 
foreign investment is taxed according to the foreign tax credit system. However, this result emerges in 
Gordon´s analysis only under quite restrictive assumptions. Firstly, the capital exporting country must 
act as a Stackelberg leader. Secondly, it is assumed that households can only invest abroad via the 
multinational firm. This assumption is problematic because it excludes, for instance, international 
portfolio investment of domestic households. In fact, the main reason why residence based taxes on 
capital income are difficult to implement is that private households may avoid these taxes by investing 
their savings in bank accounts abroad. So a more complete picture of international capital market 
integration would require the possibility of international portfolio investment by households and the 
possibility of firms to finance their investment via the international capital market. 
 
4. Tax competition with multinational firms and portfolio investment  
 
In the literature, there are some papers analyzing tax policy in the presence of both multinational firms 
and portfolio investment (Mintz and Tulkens, 1996, Fuest and Huber, 2002). What does the 
introduction of portfolio investment change? If the model discussed in the preceding section is 
extended by portfolio investment, the result that no Nash equilibrium exists under the tax credit 
system, given that both countries set their tax rates simultaneausly, vanishes. To see why, assume that 
there are many pairs of capital exporting and capital importing countries. Each pair of countries is 
linked by the direct investment of the multinational firm, as described in the preceding sections. 
However, all countries are linked by an international capital market, where households may invest 
their savings at the interest rate r. Firms also finance their investment via the international capital 
market. For each individual country, the interest rate r is given.  
 
Consider first the investment behaviour of the firm. The required rate of return on domestic and 
foreign direct investment is now r. The optimal levels of K
d and K
f are therefore given by 
( ) 1- = t F r
d
K
d  and  ( max[ , ]) 1- = t t F r
d f
K
f . Private consumption is simply  ( ) C r K K
d d f = +  and 
the government´s budget can be written as  
 
G F K L rK t t F K
d d d d d d f
K
f f = - + - ( , ) max[ , ] 0              (13) 
 
So what is the tax policy under tax competition? The capital importing country will again set t
f=t
d. So 
we can again ask if the capital exporting country would want to raise its tax rate above that of the 
capital importing country. The effect of an increase in t
d, evaluated at t
f=t
d, is 






d - + . The first term in brackets captures the negative effect of the increase in 
t
d, which is a distortion of domestic investment. Since there is complete rent taxation, it is not 




even though the capital exporting country takes t
f as given, it will not necessarily want to raise t
d 
above t
f. So a Nash equilibrium with 0<t
f=t
d<1 may exist.  
 




d) does not affect investment since there is no untaxed asset.
9 In contrast, in the 
presence of portfolio investment, an increase in t
d does distort investment, both domestic and foreign. 
The distortion in domestic investment acts as a break on the incentives to raise t
d. So it turns out that, 
if taxes on domestic and foreign corporate profits are nondiscriminatory,
10 and if households are 
allowed to invest abroad through other channels than domestic firms, the existence of tax credits and 
multinational firms can explain the observation that even small open economies levy positive 
corporate income taxes. Fuest and Huber (2002) also show that positive corporate taxe rates 
emerge under the deduction system and in the asymmetric case where one group of countries applies 
the tax credit system and another group applies the exemption system. 
 
One should note, though, that the above result is derived in a model where foreign profits can only be 
repatriated at one point in time. In a multi-period context, the result only holds if foreign investment 
income is taxed by the domestic country upon accrual or if multinational firms repatriate their profits 
in each period. In practice, most countries with tax credit systems tax foreign profits only when they 
are repatriated. Since corporate taxes in the host country have to be paid immediately whereas tax 
credits are only available when profits are repatriated, it is clear that corporate income taxes of the 
host country do affect the cost of capital and, hence, investment behaviour. The host country will 
therefore not be able to set t
f=t
d>0 without distorting capital imports. As Gordon (2000, p. 29) 
notes, given that countries usually tax foreign profits only when they are repatriated, the existence of 
tax credits would encourage the use of withholding taxes for dividend distributions rather than the use 
of corporate income taxes.  
 
Another simplifying assumption made in the above analysis is that the multinational firm only invests in 
one foreign country. If it invests in more than one foreign country, it may use excess credits for profits 
generated in high tax countries to shelter profits repatriated from low tax countries. If this “averaging“ 
allows multinational firms to entirely avoid domestic taxation of foreign profits, the domestic 
corporate income tax becomes a tax on domestic investment only. As mentioned above, it is 
inefficient for a small open economy to have such a tax.  
 
                                                 
9 In Gordon´s (1992) model, the level of investment changes because savings respond to the decline in the after 
tax return to savings. In the simpler model used here, investment does not change since savings are fixed. 
10 One may note that, if the capital exporting country was allowed to tax foreign and domestic profits at different 




5. Transfer prices and international income shifting 
 
In the literature discussed so far, it has been assumed that it is possible for the government to 
observe the location where the income of multinational firms is generated, i. e. that it is possible to 
distinguish clearly between domestic and foreign source income. This assumption is problematic for a 
number of reasons. One important issue is that, in most multinational firms, there is a significant 
amount of intra firm trade. When a multinational parent provides a service or sells a non-marketed 
good to a foreign subsidiary, a transfer price has to be charged. If market prices are not available, 
multinational firms may manipulate the transfer price in order to shift taxable income to the jurisdiction 
where taxes are lower.
11 Of course, this gives rise to tax savings only if income generated abroad 
escapes domestic taxation. This is the case, for instance, if the home country applies the exemption 
system or, to a somewhat lesser extent, if the home country oprates a tax credit system with deferral. 
 
The transfer pricing problem raises several policy issues. Firstly, governments may take the 
manipulation of transfer prices as given and adjust their tax policy accordingly. Secondly, 
governments may impose transfer pricing rules in order to prevent profit shifting. The first issue is 
analysed in Haufler and Schelderup (2000). These authors consider a standard model of tax policy in 
a small open economy, where the government may set corporate tax rates and bases. If the 
possibility of transfer price manipulation by multinational firms is ruled out, the optimal corporate tax 
policy allows for a full deduction of the costs of capital, i.e, the corporate income tax is a cash flow 
tax which implies that the marginal tax burden on domestic investment is zero. The authors then allow 
firms to manipulate transfer prices in order to shift income to low tax jurisdictions. In this case, 
countries reduce their profit tax rates in order to limit profit shifting to low tax countries. The 
opportunity of profit shifting thus acts as a restriction on profit taxation. In the presence of such a 
restriction, it is optimal to distort the investment decision. The tax on the marginal investment acts as 
a substitute for the restricted profit tax.  
 
Elitzur and Mintz (1996) analyse the issue of transfer price setting by the government. They consider 
a model where a multinational parent sells a non-marketed good to a foreign subsidiary which is run 
by a local management partner. The profit of the foreign subsidiary is a function of the manager`s 
effort, which cannot be observed by the parent. The parent thus faces a principal agent problem and 
offers a compensation to the manager which contains a share in the subsidiary`s profits. This profit 
also depends on the transfer price charged by the parent for the good sold to the subsidiary. Since 
the government is assumed not to observe the actual transfer price, it has to set a transfer price for 
tax purposes. This is done by employing a simple mark-up rule. Given this transfer price and the 
behaviour of the parent and the management partner, countries choose positive corporate income tax 
rates. In this framework, it turns out that governments use unilateral transfer pricing regulations as an 
                                                 





instrument to shift tax revenue from the foreign country to the home country (see also Mansori and 
Weichenrieder, 1999). 
 
6. The financial structure of firms 
 
6.1. The exemption system 
 
Another complication for the allocation of a firm´s income to a location is due to the possibility of 
changing a firm´s financial structure. We have assumed so far that all investment is equity financed. 
This neglects that firms may at least partly finance their investment via debt. Given that firms may 
deduct the interest payments on debt from the corporate tax base, they may shift income from one 
country to another simply by changing the financial structure of the firm. For example, the domestic 
firm may borrow funds and use them to increase the equity of a subsidiary. This has important 
implications for the cost of capital faced by multinational firms. As in the case of transfer pricing, the 
tax incentives to change the financial structure of firms depend, among other things, on the system for 
the taxation of foreign profits in the multinational firm of the home country. To begin, we consider the 
impact of taxes in the presence of the exemption system so that a taxpayer only pays corporate 
income taxes to the government where income is earned at source. In the next section, the more 
complicated foreign tax credit regimes are considered. 
 
As in the preceding sections, we consider a multinational firm with two sources of profits in two 
countries, the domestic country (with superscript d) and the foreign country (with superscript f). 
Since this section focuses on the effects of financing decisions on a multinational firm´s cost of capital 
and the shifting of profits across borders, we now suppress the fixed factor L and assume that any 
rents carned by this factor accrue as corporate income. The main difference to the models analysed 
so far, though, is that we now allow for debt financing. To keep things simple, we assume that the 
interest rate is identical for domestic and foreign debt and we abstract from personal income taxes 
and source taxes on interest or dividend payments. Interest payments on debt are deductible from 
the corporate tax base. The multination firm´s profits are given by 
 
( ) ( ) f f f f d d d d rB ) K ( F ) t 1 ( rB ) K ( F ) t 1 ( P - - + - - =           (14) 
   
where  d B and  f B denote domestic and foreign debt. The question of how the financial structure of 
firms is determined in general is a complicated issue which cannot be discussed at length here. For 
our purposes, it is sufficient to simply assume that the firm finances a share b of its overall investment 
through debt. The firm thus faces the financing constraint 
 





The tax arbitrage among businesses facing differing corporate tax ratess can be seen from equation 
(14).  For instance, a multinational can finance all of its capital from one country and transfer equity 
funds to the other. It would do so if there are tax benefits from this strategy. If the corporate tax rate 
in the foreign country is less than the home country tax rate  ) t t ( d f < , then it is obvious that the 
optimal financial policy is to finance investment with borrowing in the home country and a transfer of 
equity to the foreign country so that  ) K K ( B f d d + b = . The cost of capital for multinational 
investment in the each country would be the following: 
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b =                 (16b) 
for the foreign country, where r is the required rate of return on equity investment. Compared to a 
situation where the firm can only raise funds in the country where the real investment (K) takes 
place,
12 the foreign country now has a lower cost of capital. Moreover, the government of the home 
country loses tax revenue amounting to  f d K t b  while the foreign country government gains  f f K t b . 
The implications for the nationally optimal tax policy will be discussed further below.
 
 
6.2. Foreign tax credit regimes 
 
Consider now the case of a foreign tax credit regime.  Normally, governments do not refund taxes 
when the host country tax liability is more than the home country tax liability. Under the foreign tax 
credit system, the government will levy tax on income earned in or repatriated from the foreign 
jurisdiction by a multinational reduced by a foreign tax credit for taxes paid to the host country.  
Under the accrual system, a tax is imposed on income earned abroad whether or not it is repatriated 
back to the home country.  This treatment is commonly used for the taxation of branch income and 
passive income earned by controlled-foreign corporations.  Under the deferral system, income is 
only taxed if repatriated back to the home country.  The tax will therefore be imposed on dividends 
but not on profits reinvested in foreign entities.   
 
                                                 
12 In this case, the cost of capital in the foreign country would be 
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A. The Accrual System 
 
In the case of accrual taxation, the domestic tax on foreign profits is equal to  ( ) f f f d rB ) K ( F t - . 
The tax is reduced by a foreign tax credit equal to ( ) f f f f rB ) K ( F t - . As long as the foreign and 
home government define the multinational tax base as the same in both countries, the tax on income 
earned by the multinational in the foreign country is equal to    
( ) f f f d rB ) K ( F t -  if  f d t t ‡  (deficient tax credit position) and equal to  ( ) f f f f rB ) K ( F t -  if 
d f t t ‡ (excess credit position). Thus, the tax rate on foreign source income is  ) t , t max( d f  and the 
profits of the multinational firm are  
 
( ) ( ) f f f d f d d d d rB ) K ( F ) t , t max( 1 ( rB ) K ( F ) t 1 ( P - - + - - = .         (17) 
 
As a consequence, if  f d t t ‡ , there are no gains from shifting debt from the foreign country to the 
home country. In this case, the costs of capital in the home country is given by 
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b - + b = .                  (18a) 
 
The cost of capital for investment in the foreign country is the  
same: 
) t 1 (






b - + b = .                  (18b) 
 
In contrast, if   d f t t > , and given that there is accrual taxation, the foreign tax credit system is 
equivalent to the exemption system, i.e. the analysis of the preceding section applies.  
 
B. The Deferral Tax System 
 
The deferral tax system generally applies in the case that the multinational business is organized as a 
foreign subsidiary in the host country.  Dividends and other charges remitted to the parent are subject 
to tax by the home country. Assuming no withholding tax on dividends, the home country tax is equal 
to  ) t 1 /( D t f d -  (D denoting dividends paid by the subsidiary to the parent). The foreign tax credit is 
equal to the corporate income taxes deemed to be paid on distributed profits  ( ) f f f f t rB ) K ( F d - , d 
being the dividend payout ratio of the subsidiary.  If the profits measured for tax purposes by the 
home country is the same as that taxed by host country, then the dividend payout ratio is simply the 




Therefore, the foreign tax credit is  ) t 1 /( D t f f - . If  f d t t ‡ , the repatriation tax to the home 
country is thus equal to  
 
D D
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f d
f f f d Q ”
-
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= - - - .            (19) 
 
The multinational´s income in the presence of the deferral system is equal to the following 
 
( ) ( ) D rB ) K ( F ) t 1 ( rB ) K ( F ) t 1 ( P f f f f d d d d Q - - - + - - = .        (20) 
 
It is clear, therefore, that the optimal financial strategy is for the subsidiary not to pay dividends to the 
parent in order to avoid the repatriation tax.  With reinvestment of profits (therefore deferral of the 
home country tax), the cost of equity finance would be equal to the discount rate for equity finance.    
 
The deferral method therefore results in a model somewhat similar to the pecking order model in that 
reinvestment of profits is preferable to financing investment with new equity.  As Sinn (1990) points 
out, a firm in its gestation phase of growth may not have sufficient internal cash flow to finance 
investment. It must either rely on tax deductible debt or take equity transfers from the parent.  If 
transfers of equity are used, the multinational anticipates that the income is “trapped” in the subsidiary 
in that any future dividends paid would attract the repatriation tax.  Therefore, the cost of equity 
finance is greater for parent transfers compared to reinvested earnings.  However, debt finance may 
still be more attractive to use than retained profits to finance the subsidiary’s capital investments.  
Some countries have try to limit deferral through limitations on the amount of reinvested profits that 
qualify for exempt taxation (Weichenrieder, 1996). 
 
If the firm is in its mature stage, the cost of capital for the multinational for the deferral case would be 
the following 
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For the home country and: 
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Compared to the accrual method (equation (18b)), the cost of capital is lower in the foreign country 
since the subsidiary avoids payment of home country taxes on the income earned by the foreign 
subsidiary. 





The above characterization of multinational finance in the presence of the foreign tax credit regime is 
typically used for analysis. However, it fails to account for some important tax planning complexities, 
depending on the existing regime. 
 
One issue is that home countries may not define the income of the foreign subsidiary in the same way 
as the host country (Leechor and Mintz, 1993). For example, the US and the UK use a different 
definition of income to determine the tax base of the subsidiary than that used by host country.  For 
example, suppose y
f is the taxable income of the subsidiary as defined by the foreign country tax 
authorities (for example, some income could be exempt or cost deductions differ from accounting 
cost measures). Suppose further that the home country defines taxable income of the subsidiary as 
y
d. In this case, the foreign tax credit is given by   f f t dy while the dividend pay out ratio is calculated 
as  ( ) ) t 1 ( y / D d f d - = , so that the repatriation tax would therefore be equal to  D
y
y
) t 1 (








Since  f d y y „ , the repatriation tax is no longer exogenous – instead the ratio of  f d y / y  will 
depend on the capital stock and financing decisions of the subsidiary. Therefore, the cost of capital 
for the subsidiary should incorporate the impact of capital stock decisions on the repatriation tax.  In 
some situations, the cost of capital could be lower if the capital stock decision expand taxable 
income of the host country so much more than that defined by the home country such that the 
repatriation tax declines. Further, it is no longer case that it may optimal to only reinvest profits -- 
instead, it might be optimal to repatriate dividends especially if it permits greater use of debt finance 
that has its own tax benefits. 
 
A further complication is that foreign tax credit systems often permit multinationals to calculate tax 
liabilities on income remitted from various sources on a “global basis”.  Income received from several 
sources (different countries or different types of income such as interest and dividends) are 
aggregated to calculate the home country’s tax liability and foreign tax credits.   Thus, excess tax 
credits on high-tax foreign sources of income (due to high foreign tax rates) can be used to offset the 
repatriation tax owing on income lightly taxed by foreign tax jurisdictions.  Thus, multinationals when 
repatriating income earned from abroad average foreign tax rates to avoid paying the repatriation tax 
(see Altshuler and Newlon, 1993).  This can be achieved, for example, by simultaneously 
repatriating dividend and host country tax deductible charges paid by the subsidiary such as royalty 
income (the latter often subject to low withholding tax rates).  They will also try to repatriate income 
with as little excess tax credits as possible – otherwise, they are paying too much tax to foreign 
income. Thus, a multinational firm in an excess tax credit position will push up leverage in foreign 
subsidiaries that are subject to high levels of tax. 
 





A typical international tax planning strategy at the international level is to route financing through third 
countries rather than the parent transferring directly funds to finance subsidiary investments.  An 
example of this  strategy is the following: 
1.  The parent borrows to finance a transfer of equity to a subsidiary operating in a jurisdiction with a 
low tax regime (the tax preference provided is possibly limited to income earned by international 
financing entities).  Usually, the jurisdiction chosen is one with a tax treaty with the home country.   
2.  Little or no withholding taxes are imposed on dividends repatriated from the entity to the parent.  
The parent may be exempt from paying corporate tax on the dividends or may be in an excess credit 
position if the home country tax foreign income with a credit on a global basis. 
3.  The financing entity in the intermediary country lends funds to a subsidiary in the host country. 
4.  The subsidiary remits interest, often exempt from withholding tax by treaty.  Such interest earned 
by the subsidiary is exempt from taxation by the home country since the interest is viewed as paid 
from active business income rather than passive income (passive income may be subject to accrual 
taxation by the home country). 
5.  Effectively, the multinational is able to deduct interest incurred to finance a subsidiary in two 
jurisdictions – in the host country and home country. 
Other structures similar to the above are used for insurance receipts, factoring and service charges.   
Many possible third country regimes are available to multinationals to take advantage of the tax 
benefits provided through intermediary financing.  Depending on treaty arrangements, these include 
low-tax regimes in Barbados, Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Cyprus and Mauritius. 
The key elements are little or no withholding taxes imposed on dividends and other remitted income, 
low taxes imposed by the intermediary country and the absence or low taxes levied by the home 
country on income earned in the intermediary country.   It is frequent to route income through many 
countries, creating multiple deductions for interest expense for one investment project. 
 
The implications of the such financing schemes is to lower the cost of capital.  Effectively, for each 
dollar of borrowing by the subsidiary, interest expense is written off at the rate t
f in the host country 
and then at the rate t
d in the home country.  Ignoring some small transaction and tax costs for routing 
income through intermediary country, the effective cost of debt finance for investment in the host 
country is  ( ) f d t t 1 r - - . This implies that the cost of capital is the following: 
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b =               (22b) 
for the foreign country.  
 





How will the possibility of financial arbitrage affect incentives for tax competition? A simple model of 
tax competition with financial arbitrage is developed in Mintz and Smart (2001), and their main 
theoretical result can also be derived in the model developed above. Assume for simplicity that the 
governments of both the domestic and the foreign country pursue the objective to maximize 
corporate tax revenue, which we denote by T
d and T
f, respectively. Assume further that the level of 
debt for the firm as a whole must be zero, i.e.  0 B B f d = + . This implies that debt financing can 
only occur in the form of a credit from the parent company to the subsidiary, financed by issuing 
equity in the domestic country or vice versa. We also assume that the level of debt in a jurisdiction 
cannot exceed the level of real investment (K). The optimal financing strategy of the firm is the 
following. Assume that the domestic country is the high tax country, i.e.  f d t t > . In this case, the 
firm will simply issue equity  f d K K + in the foreign country and give a credit of  d K to the parent 
company. Effectively, domestic investment is thus entirely debt financed. The firm´s overall profits are  
 
( ) ( ) d f f f d d d d rK ) K ( F ) t 1 ( rK ) K ( F ) t 1 ( P + - + - - =           (23) 
 
What are the implications for tax revenue? Tax revenue in the domestic (high tax) country is 
  
( ) d d d d d rK ) K ( F t T - = .                   (24) 
 
For the foreign country, we have 
 
( ) d f f f f rK ) K ( F t T + = .                  (25) 
 
The key theoretical result derived by Mintz and Smart (2001) is that there is no symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. Firstly, if  0 t t f d > = , country d (f) can achieve an increase of its tax base by 
f rK ( d rK ) through a marginal reduction of its tax rate. Secondly,  0 t t f d = = cannot be an 
equilibrium because each country could raise its tax revenue by increasing its tax rate. As a result, 
there can only be an asymmetric equilibrium, where one country pursues a high tax strategy and the 
other country sets low taxes in order to attract tax part of the tax base from the high tax country.
13 A 
high tax country may be efficient if domestic investment earns high inframarginal rents. Levying high 








Although there are some significant issues involved with modelling the cost of capital and finance for 
multinational investments, it is clear that there are a number of international tax planning issues that 
result in either higher or lower costs of capital for multinationals relative to companies only investing 
in domestic markets.  Thus, depending on circumstances, taxes could either favour or discourage 
cross-border investments relative to domestic investments. 
The possibility of shifting income from high to low tax jurisdictions brings a new dimension to 
international tax competition. Although there is yet relatively little theoretical work on tax competition 
with financial arbitrage, the existing literature has shown that the emerging results differ significantly 
from those derived in traditional models of tax competition. 
 
III. Tax Competition and Tax Coordination  
 
In the preceding section, we have discussed the tax policy countries pursue to maximize national 
welfare and the way in which they interact. It is clear from the analysis in the preceding sections that 
the interaction of the policies of individual countries does not necessarily lead to outcomes which are 
efficient for the economy as a whole. Many contributions to the literature therefore argue that 
countries should coordinate their tax policies. One key question in this debate is whether tax rates 
are too high or too low under tax competition. Another key issue in the literature on tax coordination 
is the question of whether tax competition may be a desirable limitation of the taxing powers of 
national governments due to political economy considerations. This section surveys the rapidly 
growing literature dealing with these issues.      
 
1. Source based capital taxes and the underprovision of public goods 
 
There is a large number of contributions arguing that tax competition will lead to levels of taxes and 
public expenditure that are below the optimal level for the economy as a whole (Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski, 1986, Wilson, 1986, Wildasin, 1989, Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1989). In this section, 
we retrace the basic argument that leads to the underprovision result. We do so using a model which 
differs somewhat from the models used in section II. Consider a world of n jurisdictions which are 
economically integrated but politically independent. In each country, there is an internationally 
immobile representative citizen who lives for two periods. The utility of the representative citizen is 
U(C1,C2,G), where C 1 and C2 denote private consumption in periods 1 and 2 and G is a public 
good. To keep things simple, assume that U(.) has the form U=M(C1)+C2+H(G) where M(.) and 
H(.) are strictly concave. This utility function implies that there is no income effect on savings. The 
local public good is provided by a government that finances its expenditure via a source tax (t) per 
unit of capital (K). Capital is internationally mobile.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
13 Mintz and Smart (2001) argue that the observed subfederal tax policy in Canada supports these findings. While 




There is a representative firm in each country which invests K in period 1 and produces a composite 
commodity Y in period 2, which can be transformed into the private consumption good or the public 
good on a one-to one basis. The production function is Y=F(K), with FK>0 and FKK<0. The firm´s 
profits are P=F(K)-(r+t)K, where r is the interest rate in the world capital market. Profit 
maximization  yields the firm`s capital demand function K(r+t), with K r+t=1/FKK<0. Firms are 
assumed to be owned by the domestic household and to produce only domestically. The 
household´s budget constraint is as follows. in the first period, the household has an initial 
endowment E, which may be consumed in period 1 or saved. We thus have E=C1+S. In the second 
period, the household receives income from savings and the profits of the firm. For the moment, we 
will assume that there are neither taxes on income from savings nor taxes on pure profits (or rent 
taxes). The household´s second period budget constraint is thus C2=rS+P.  
 
The household maximizes utility subject to the budget constraints for the two periods. As a result, on 
can derive the household´s savings function as S=S(r), with Sr=-1/MCC>0. The households utlity can 
be expressed in terms of the indirect utility function V=V(r,P,G), with Vr=lS, V P=l, and V G=HG, 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and l is the marginal utility of private income in period 2. 
Note that, since U is linear in C2, we have l=1 and thus Vr=S and VP=1. 
 
In a regime of tax competition, the government in each country sets t in order to maximize the welfare 
of the representative household U subject to the public sector budget constraint tK=G. We assume 
that the impact of each jurisdiction on the world interest rate is so small that the government neglects 
it when making its policy choices. If we substitute the public sector budget constraint into the indirect 
utility function, the government`s problem may be formulated as one of simply maximizing V(r,P,tK) 
over t. Define the elasticity of the capital tax base as h=t Kr+t/K<0, The first-order condition Vt=0, 





= + h                      (26) 
 
Equation (26) shows that the marginal utility of the public good, HG, is higher than the marginal utility 
of private consumption in the second period, which equals unity. This implies that, under tax 
competition, there is an underprovision of public goods relative to the first-best allocation. Oates and 
Schwab (1988) explain this as follows.“Communities realize that as they raise the tax rate to finance 
the local public good, they will drive out capital. Thus, they raise the tax rate only to the point at 
which the cost of the public good, including the negative effects of a smaller capital stock, equals the 
benefits.“(ibid., pp. 342-343). Of course, the finding that there will be an underprovision of public 
goods in the sense that  HG >1 is not a specific problem of tax competition. If public expenditure is 
                                                                                                                                                         




financed with distortionary taxes as, for instance, a capital tax, it is clear that the optimal level of 
public goods provision will be different from the first best level, which would be HG =1.  
 
In fact, the notion that tax competition gives rise to an underprovision of public goods refers to a 
different issue. Given that public expenditure has to be financed via distortionary taxes, will tax 
competition lead to the second best optimal level of public goods provision for the economy as a 
whole? In the benchmark model considered here, the answer is that public goods provision is 
inefficiently low. This can be demonstrated as follows. Assume that, departing from the equilibrium 
under tax competition, all countries simultaneously raise their capital tax t by a small amount dt and 
use the additional revenue to increase G. Note first that the tax increase will affect the interest rate in 
the international capital market. It is straightforward to show that dr/dt<0. The overall effect of this 
coordinated tax increase on the welfare of a representative household is dV=Vtdt+Vrdr. Since Vt=0 
holds in the equilibrium under tax competition, the welfare effect boils down to dV=Vrdr=S-
K+HGtKr+tdr. In a symmetric equilibrium, no country can be net capital exporter or importer, such 
that S=K. The welfare effect of a cordinated tax increase is thus dV/dt=HGtKr+tdr/dt>0.  
 
Why are source based capital taxes under tax competition too low? The reason is that an increase in 
the capital tax rate in one country gives rise to a positive (fiscal) externality since it triggers a capital 
outflow to other countries. These countries benefit from the capital inflow for the following reason: 
The marginal cost of capital to the country equals the interest rate r. The marginal benefit to the 
country, in turn, exceeds the interest rate since there is a positive capital tax. Output increases by 
FK=r+t. The net welfare gain associated with a marginal capital inflow is tHG.
14 One may note here 
that the existence of the fiscal externality is due to the fact that the government raises a distortionary 
capital tax. If the government could use lump sum taxes, it would set t=0, such that the fiscal 
externality and, hence, the underprovision result would vanish. This suggests that the welfare 
implications of tax competition critically depend on the available tax instruments, as will be discussed 
further below. 
 
                                                 
14 The role of tax distortions for explaining the issue of fiscal externalities is emphasized by Bucovetsky and 




2. Labour taxes 
 
The underprovision result developed above plays an important role in the tax competition literature 
and has been extended but also qualified in several respects. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) extend 
the set of available tax instruments by assuming that the governments may use both labour and capital 
taxes to finance public expenditure. In their model, it turns out that, under tax competition, the capital 
tax is zero and public expenditure is financed exclusively by the labour tax, although this tax distorts 
the labour-leisure choice of the representative household. The reason for this result is that, since the 
supply of capital is perceived as infinitely elastic by each individual country, the burden of a capital 
tax would be borne by the factor labour anyway. It is more efficient to tax this factor directly. 
 
The analysis in Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) also leads to the conclusion that there is an 
underprovision of public goods under tax competition. The reason is that an increase in the wage tax 
rate to finance more public expenditure also triggers a positive fiscal externality. The higher wage tax 
rate reduces labour supply and thus reduces the marginal productivity of capital in the country under 
consideration. Consequently, capital flows to other countries. These countries benefit from the capital 
inflow although capital is not taxed because the capital inflow raises the marginal productivity of 
labour and, hence, labour supply. It is now the wage tax that drives a wedge between the marginal 
social cost of labour, which equals the net wage, and the marginal benefit, that is the gross wage. 
 
3. Residence based taxation 
 
Another important result in Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) is derived for the case where the 
available tax instruments are a source tax and a residence based tax on capital. In this case, tax 
policy under tax competition is efficient and nothing can be gained from tax coordination, given that 
no other tax instruments are available. The important role of residence based taxes can also be 
demonstrated using a slightly extended version of the model developed above. Assume that, next to 
the source based capital tax t, the government may raise a residence based tax on the household´s 
income from savings. In this case, the household´s savings will be a function of the after tax return on 
savings which we done by r
n. The government budget constraint is now G=tK+(r-r
n)S and the 
household´s indirect utility function can be written as V=V(r
n,P, tK+(r-r
n)S). The avalibility of the 
savings tax implies that, for a given r, the government may effectively set r
n. The first-order condition 
for the optimal savings tax Vr





= -qe                      (27) 
  
where e = r S S
n
rn /  is the interest elasticity of savings and q = - ( ) / r r r
n . Equations (26) and (27) 




taxes. While the source based tax distorts domestic investment, the residence based tax distorts 
savings. Interestingly, although the residence based savings tax is itself distortionary, it implies that the 
underprovision of public goods under tax competition vanishes, i.e. tax coordination cannot raise 
welfare. To see this, assume again that, departing from the equilibrium under tax competition, all 
countries raise the source based capital tax by dt, holding constant r
n, and use the revenue to 
increase public expenditure G. The welfare effect would be dV=Vrdr. We now have V r=-
K+HG(S+tKr+t). Since S=K due to the symmetry assumption, and using equation (26), it turns out 
that Vr=0, such that dV=0. The coordinated tax increase does not affect welfare.  
 
Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) explain the absence of gains from tax coordination in the presence of 
both source and residence based capital taxes as follows: “The presence of both taxes allows a 
government to manipulate gross and net returns to capital...independently of the world return ...With 
both taxes, the region is effectively able to insulate itself from the capital flows that occur in response 
to another region´s tax and expenditure policy.“(ibid., p.349.). It thus turns out that the availability of 




4. Tax competition and optimal redistributive income taxation 
 
A further extension of available tax instruments, along with a relaxation of the assumption of perfect 
information and identical households, is considered by Huber (1999), who analyses tax competition 
in a Mirrlees-Stiglitz type model of optimum income taxation. In each country, there are two types of 
individuals which differ with respect to their earning abilities and have different endowments with 
capital. Capital taxation according to the residence principle is ruled out. The government uses a 
non-linear income tax system to finance a public good and redistribute income between individuals. 
Redistributive policies are constrained by the fact that abilities cannot be observed directly. The 
government therefore faces an incentive compatability constraint. In this framework, the result that 
capital taxes tend to be too low under tax competition is confirmed for the case where individuals 
with higher abilities also own more capital than low ability individuals. Essentially, a capital tax 
increase in all jurisdictions would then redistribute income from high to low ability individuals. This 
leads to a welfare gain, given the second-best nature of redistributive policies in this model.  
 
Fuest and Huber (2001a) also consider tax competition and tax coordination in a model where tax 
policy aims at redistributing income and faces informational constraints. In their model, individuals 
have equal abilities but differ with respect to their endowment with capital. Governments are able to 
raise a residence based capital income tax and tax labour and capital income differently, but 
individuals may, at some cost, shift labour to capital income and vice versa to avoid taxes. The 
government can only observe reported income, that is labour and capital income after shifting has 
                                                 




taken place. Since rich households may shift capital to labour income in order to mimick poor 
households, redistributive taxation has to take into account an incentive compatability constraint. In 
this model, it also turns out that capital tax rates are inefficiently low under tax competition. 
 
5. May capital taxes be too high under tax competition? 
 
The literature discussed so far suggests that tax competition leads to an underprovision of public 
goods so that coordinated tax increases are desirable. However, there are several reasons why 
capital taxes may in fact be too high under tax competition. Moreover, coordinated capital tax 
increases may benefit only some countries while others lose. These issues are discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
5.1. Country Size and Asymmetries 
 
In the contributions discussed so far, it has been assmed that jurisdictions are symmetric and small. 
The latter means that the capital demand of one jurisdictions has a negligible effect on the interest rate 
in the international capital market. If one relaxes this assumption, not much changes if large but 
symmetric jurisdictions are considered. Governments may now use tax policy to exploit their market 
power in the international capital market. Yet, an increase of the capital tax rate in one country still 
triggers a capital ouflow. Hoyt (1991) analyses a model with large and symmetric jurisdictions, 
where a source tax on capital is the only tax instrument available to finance the provision of a local 
public good. He shows that the equilibrium tax rate and, hence, the level of public goods provision is 
higher, the lower the number of competing jurisdictions. Still, the problem of an inefficiently low 
provision of public goods under tax competition also carries over to large and symmetric 
jurisdictions. 
  
Things change, however, once the assumption of symmetry is relaxed. De Pater and Myers (1994) 
analyse a model where jurisdictions are large and differ with respect to their endowments with 
capital. In this framework, capital taxes are used to strategically influence the interest rate in the 
international capital market. Capital importing countries tax domestic investment in order to reduce 
the interest rate whereas capital exporting countries do the opposite. It is clear that this leads to tax 
structures that are inefficient from the point of view of the economy as a whole, even if the 
governments may in principle use lump sum taxes to finance their expenditure. The reason is that the 
effect of tax policy on the interest rate gives rise to pecuniary externalities. Capital taxes will then be 
inefficiently high in capital importing regions and vice versa. 
 
While the idea that large countries may use their market power to strategically influence prices is 
familiar from international trade theory, asymmetries between countries also affect the working of tax 




jurisdictions are identical except for t he size of the labour force.
16 He shows that, under tax 
competition, individuals are better off in the small country. The reason is that the capital tax raised by 
a country is higher, the stronger the effect of its capital demand on the interest rate in the international 
capital market, i.e. the lower the elasticity of capital supply. The capital demand of the large country 
has a stronger impact on the interest rate than that of the small country. The former therefore raises a 
higher capital tax rate. Since  the cost of capital is thus lower in the small country, per capita 
investment is higher and, hence, the wage rate is also higher. This advantage of being small implies 
that, if the size difference is sufficiently large, the small country may actually be better off under tax 
competition, where public expenditure is financed, on the margin, with capital taxes
17, than in a 
coordinated equilibrium or a first-best situation where unrestricted lump sum taxes are available.
18  
 
The result that small countries benefit from tax competition, however, may not hold for all types of 
investment. Haufler and Wooton (1999) argue that, in the presence of imperfect competition and 
transport costs, large countries may actually be at an advantage when countries compete for foreign 
direct investment. The model considered by these authors assumes that there is a multinational firm 
that sells its output on a goods market with imperfect competition. Since there are transport costs, 
the firm will prefer to locate in the larger market. This gives rise to a locational rent for the large 
country, which may be exploited by tax policy, which means that the large country may raise higher 
taxes (or offer lower subsidies) than the small country and will still receive the investment. 
 
5.2. Tax Exportation and Multinational Firms 
 
One important reason why tax competition may lead to over- rather than undertaxation is the 
phenomenon of tax exportation. Tax exportation occurs if governments raise taxes which are at least 
partly borne by the citizens of other jurisdictions. Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) consider a model 
where domestic firms are owned by foreigners and the taxation of pure profits is assumed to be 
restricted for exogenous reasons. In this framework, it turns out that countries will raise source taxes 
on capital in order to indirectly tax profits and thus shift income from foreign firm owners to domestic 
residents. It may even be optimal for an individual country to raise capital taxes and use the revenue 
to make lump sum payments to its citizens. In a world with an endogenous savings decision, this may 
give rise to an overtaxation of capital. Here, the nature of the emerging fiscal externality is quite 
                                                 
16 Bucovetsky (1991) analyses a similar model but restricts the analysis to quadratic production functions. 
17 These results also go through if a distortionary wage tax is available next to the capital tax. However, if the 
supply of public goods is endogenous (as opposed to a fixed revenue constraint), the gains of small countries 
from tax competition are reduced, see Eggert and Haufler (1998) and Haufler (2001), chapter 5. 
18 As Wilson (1991) emphasizes, the result that small countries tend to benefit from tax competition is opposed to 
the findings of international trade theory and the theory of “tariff wars“, where small countries are at a 




obvious. Countries do not take into account that their capital taxes reduce the profit income and 
distort the savings decisions of households residing in other jurisdictions.
19 
 
Another form of tax exportation may occur in the presence of multinational firms. This issue is studied 
in Mintz and Tulkens (1996). They show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxation of 
individual countries gives rise to negative externalities. Two channels of these negative externalities 
are identified. Firstly, countries tax the profits of foreign multinationals operating within their borders, 
which reduces profit income accruing to other countries.
20 Secondly, countries tax the foreign profits 
of domestic multinational firms. This has a negative impact on foreign investment and therefore 
reduces the tax revenue and the income of immobile factors generated abroad. These negative fiscal 
externalities suggest that, in the presence of international direct investment, tax competition may 
actually lead to over- rather than undertaxation of capital income.  
 
Fuest and Huber (2002) explicitly analyse the welfare effects of coordinated tax increases in the 
presence of multinational firms. They compare the effects of tax competition under the exemption 
system, the deduction system and the foreign tax credit system. It turns out that capital taxes may be 
too high under tax competition if countries apply the deduction system or the tax credit system while 
taxes are too low under the exemption system. The reason is that, under the exemption system, 
capital taxes are effectively purely source based, so that no tax exportation occurs.  
 
5.3. Imperfect competition in labour markets 
 
Most of the literature of tax competition assumes that markets are perfectly competitive. This 
assumption is probably most problematic for labour markets. Especially in Europe, labour markets 
tend to be characterized by minimum wages and collective wage bargaining. Lejour and Verbon 
(1996) consider a two country model with imperfect capital mobility, where wages are set by 
monopoly unions. The population in each country consists of workers, who may be employed or 
unemployed, and capital owners who may invest at home or abroad. The government runs a social 
insurance system consisting of a proportional wage tax that finances transfers to the unemployed. The 
strategic policy variable is the tax rate of the social insurance system. Increases in the tax rate are 
partly shifted to capital owners via higher wages. Capital owners will therefore prefer a lower tax 
rate than workers. The government is assumed to maximize a generalised utilitarian welfare function 
of all residents. 
 
In this model, changes in the policy of an individual country also affects the welfare of other 
countries. However, the fiscal externality will affect foreign workers and foreign capital owners in 
                                                 
19 Foreign firm ownership, though,may also give rise to suboptimally low corporate income taxes as shown by 
Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2003), who consider a model where the corproate income tax serves as a backstop to the 
personal income tax. 




different ways. Foreign workers will benefit from an increase in the domestic social insurance tax rate 
since it triggers a capital flow to the foreign country. Foreign capital owners, in contrast, are affected 
negatively because their investment opportunities are deteriorated. On balance, however, it turns out 
that the positive fiscal externality dominates such that, in terms of overall welfare, social security tax 
rates are too low under tax competition.  
 
Fuest and Huber (1999) also consider a model with a non-competitive labour market a nd 
unemployment. Countries are small, and the wage rate is determined via bargaining between unions 
and firms. The government in each country raises a wage tax and a source tax on capital to finance a 
public good. Under tax competition, the structure of wage and capital taxes is in general 
undetermined, which means that the equilibrium tax structure may differ from that emerging under 
competitive labour markets. The reason is that taxation may affect the outcome of wage bargaining. 
In this framework, it also turns out that the tax policy of individual countries gives rise to both positive 
and negative fiscal externalities. The positive externalities are similar to those found in models with 
competitive labour markets. The negative externalities are caused by the impact of capital flows on 
wage bargaining. A capital inflow may encourage unions to raise the wage rate in the bargaining 
process and thus worsen the labour market distortion. It turns out that the negative fiscal externality 




5.4. Political Economy Models 
 
The theories of tax competition discussed so far are based on the assumption that governments 
maximize the welfare of their citizens. This implies that the analysis abstracts from inefficiencies 
caused by imperfections of the political process. Public choice theorist have argued that these 
imperfections of the political process give rise to excessive government growth. From this 
persepective, tax competition may be seen as a desirable check on the expansion of the public 
sector. The most radical version of this argument is due to Brennan and Buchanan (1980), who 
model government as a revenue maximizing Leviathan without any interest in the well being of the 
citizens. If this view of government is taken seriously, it is clear that tax competition is a highly 
welcome way of restrictimg the power to tax. Obviously, a serious limitation of the Leviathan model 
is that it abstracts completely from institutions such as elections by which modern democracies create 
incentives for the members of governments to take into account the welfare of citizens and voters.
22 
 
                                                 
21 Further contributions to issue of how tax competion affects tax policy in the presence of unemployment, but 
without reference to tax coordination, include Richter and Schneider (2001), Eggert and Görke () and Leite-
Monteiro, Marchand and Pestieau (2003). 
22 Frey and Eichenberger (1996) emphasize that both economic distortions such as the underprovision of public 
goods and political distortions caused by imperfections of the political process should be taken into account in 




A somewhat more balanced approach is used by Edwards and Keen (1996). These authors 
consider a model of a large number of small open economies with capital mobility, where the stock 
of capital for the economy as a whole is fixed. It is assumed that governments maximize an objective 
function of the type Z=Z(U,H), with Z U‡0 and Z H‡0, where U is the utility of the representative 
citizen and H is a variable that stands for resources wasted due to imperfections of the political 
process. The objective function Z may be interpreted as a popularity function and comprises the 
polar cases of a purely benevolent government (ZH=0) and that of a revenue maximizer (ZU=0).  
 
The equilibrium under tax competition is characterized by a tax structure which is the same as that 
which would be chosen by a benevolent government, given the level of public expenditure. The 
reason is that politicians, whether selfish or benevolent, have no interest in raising revenue in an 
inefficient way. However, political economy considerations do make a difference with respect to the 
overall level and the structure of public expenditure; the structure is different because part of the 
revenue is now devoted to socially wasteful expenditure. In this setup, fiscal competition tends to 
limit government waste but also reduces socially desirable public expenditure. The authors show that 
a coordinated increase in capital taxes has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the representative 
citizen. Welfare is more likely to increase, the higher the marginal excess burden of the tax system 
under tax competition and the lower the marginal propensity of the government to waste resources.
23  
 
Another set of political economy approaches to tax competition discusses the impact of increasing 
capital mobility on fiscal policy decisions. Persson and Tabellini (1992) consider a two-stage variant 
of the  median voter model where, in each country, a government is elected at stage one. The 
governments then set tax policy in a tax competition game played at stage two. In this model, the 
level of public expenditure is also given, such that the relevant decision is on the distribution of the tax 
burden between labour and capital. Increasing capital mobility has two opposing effects. On the one 
hand, there is what the authors call the “economic effect“: greater capital mobility increases tax 
competition and therefore drives down the capital tax rate. On the other hand, the authors find a 
“political effect“: Voters anticipate the behaviour of their governments in the tax competition game 
and will elect more “leftist“ governments in order to prevent an excessive reduction of the capital tax 
rate.
24 On balance, however, the economic effect dominates and a larger part of the tax burden is 
borne by labour as capital mobility increases.  
                                                 
23 Fuest (2000) extends the Edwards-Keen model by introducing a bureaucracy into the model. Politicians and 
bureaucrats have diverging interests and the political decision making process is modelled as a bargaining game 
between these two groups. It turns out that coordinated capital tax increases unambiguously reduce the welfare 
of the representative citizen if the bureaucrats dominate the decision making process. Sato (2001) extends the 
Edwards-keen model by explicitly considering a rent seeking game. The welfare effects of coordinated tax 
increases are also ambiguous. 
24 An interesting variant of the approached developed in Persson and Tabellini (1992) is analysed by Brückner 
(2000). He shows that, if voters anticipate that governments will coordinate taxes, tax competition may occur at 
the voting (or delegation) stage, i.e. voters will delegate politicians with low preferences for public goods. It is 
therefore unclear whether capital tax rates are higher under tax coordination compared to a regime of tax 





Fuest and Huber (2001b) analyse tax competition and tax coordination in a model where individuals 
differ with respect to their labour income and their capital endowments and fiscal policy decisions are 
taken via majority voting. The government in each country raises a labour income tax and a source 
based capital tax and provides a local public good. Although the policy space is two-dimensional, a 
median voter equilibrium exists. The reason is that all voters, irrespective of their labour income, will 
prefer not to tax capital at source. For the wage tax and, hence, the level of expenditure on the local 
public good, the median voter´s preferences will determine the policy outcome. In the equilibrium, 
the level of public good provision is determined by two countervailing forces. First, the level of public 
goods provision will be lower, the higher the marginal excess burden of the wage tax because the 
median voter will also have to bear the cost of tax distortions. Second, the level of public goods 
provision will be higher, the greater the difference between average and median labour income. This 
reflects the redistributive nature of the local public good. All residents benefit equally from the 
provision of this good, but the median voter`s share in the cost of the public good is proportional to 
labour income. In the empirically revelevant case where the median voter`s income is below average 
income, there may thus be an overpovision of public goods under tax competition.  
 
Grazzini and Ypersele (2003) also consider problems of tax competition in a median voter model. 
The framework used is a two-country model with capital mobility, where the governments raise 
source taxes on capital and labour taxes. It is assumed, however, that the level of public expenditure 
is fixed, such that the voting decision is only over the mix between capital and labour taxes that 
finances the public budget. The authors show that, if countries are asymmetric, tax coordination 
agreements may fail to receive political support.  
 
Gabszewicz and Ypersele (1996) also consider the effects of increasing capital mobility in a political 
economy model where the strategic policy variable is a transfer to unemployed workers which also 
constitutes a minimum wage rate. The level of the minimum wage is determined via majority voting. 
Essentially, the voting outcome is determined by the factor endowment of the median voter. The 
minimum wage rate raises the income of employed workers but also reduces employment. It turns 
out that, even if the median voter is endowed with labour only, increasing capital mobility drives 
down the equilibrium minimum wage.  
 
Taken together, political economy models of tax competition suggest two conclusions. Firstly, 
although imperfections of the political process are not sufficient to overturn the result that tax 
competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates, contributions neglecting political economy problems 
give rise to an excessively pessimistic assessment of the welfare implications of tax competition. 
Secondly, the literature dealing with the effects of increasing capital mobility on the distribution of the 
tax burden between capital and immobile labour seems to confirm the intuitively plausible view 





6. Regional versus Global Coordination 
 
It has been assumed so far that tax coordination involves all countries in the world. But real world tax 
coordination initiatives are usually restricted to a certain subgroup of countries like the EU member 
states or the OECD countries. If capital tax coordination only takes place among a subset of 
countries, the problem arises that capital may still flow to countries not participating in the 
coordination agreements. This raises the question whether the arguments in favour of coordinated 
capital tax increases are still  valid if there are third countries not participating in the coordination 
agreement. The answer is that, if the group of countries which participates in the coordination 
agreement is large enough to have an impact on the international interest rate, there are potential 
welfare gains from regional tax coordination (see also Konrad and Schjelderup (1999)). Sorensen 
(2000, 2001) analyses the welfare effects of regional tax coordination in simulation models and 
confirms the finding that there are welfare gains from regional tax coordination but also shows that 
these gains are lower than the gains from worldwide coordination. 
 
Haufler and Wooton (2001) focus on regional tax coordination in a model where countries compete 
for direct investment of an internationally mobile firm. They consider a world of three countries. Two 
of them may form a union and coordinate taxes. It turns out that there are two types of gains from 
regional tax coordination. Firstly, if the investment would be located in the union under tax 
competition, tax coordination within the union allows the country where the investment is located to 
extract higher rents from the firm. Secondly, tax coordination yields a benefit by internalizing fiscal 
externalities within the union. Interestingly, it is unclear whether regional tax coordination increases or 
decreases tax rates in this model.   
  
IV. Conclusions 
The interaction of corporate income taxes and international capital flows suggests that the source-
based capital taxes potentially result in quite significant distortions in the allocation of capital at the 
international level.  Much economic analysis has viewed that capital taxes will disappear if real capital 
is perfectly mobile at the international level.  However, given that this view assumes that economies 
are small and there are no impediments to the free flow of capital, reality would suggest that 
competition for real capital is less extreme than what typical economic models would suggest.  There 
are good reasons for countries to tax mobile capital if governments can “export” taxes paid by non-
residents. Competitiveness may make it more difficult for countries to tax income earned by 




                                                 
25 Of course, limited capital mobility does not necessarily imply that capital taxes survive, as is shown by Gordon 




Instead, the problems with corporate taxation are much deeper than what would be suggested by 
models with perfect mobility of real capital. One issue is that taxable profits are highly mobile, leading 
to the “tax base flight” fiscal externality dominating other fiscal externalities in this case. Governments 
have been trying to protect their tax bases by imposing restrictions that lead to an erosion of profits 
as well as reducing statutory tax rates. The other issue is that it is increasingly difficult to impose a tax 
on income earned in a jurisdiction by a growing multinational sector in a more integrated global 
economy. New technology and financial transactions makes it more problematical to define profits 
earned in one country alone.  Governments have been  increasing their reliance on profit-based 
measures of transfer prices since these can rely more on allocation methods for global profits of 
multinationals rather than transaction-based rules. Nonetheless, administrative practices will require 
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